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Abstract
The modern advanced avionics in new high-
performance aircraft strains the capability of
current technology to safely monitor these systems
for flight test prior to their generalized use.
New techniques are needed to improve the ability
of systems engineers to understand and analyze
complex systems in the limited time available
during crucial periods of the flight test. The
Dryden Flight Research Facility of NASA's Ames
Research Center is involved in the design and
implementation of an expert system to provide
expertise and knowledge to aid the flight systei,s
engineer. This paper discusses the need `or new
techniques in monitoring flight systems	 the
conceptual design of an expert-system
status monitor. The status of the current, project
and its goals are described.
Nomenclature
AFTI	 advanced fighter technology integration
DFCS	 digital flight control system
FCC fire control	 computer
FCS flight control	 system
FSW forward-swept wing
HiMAT highly maneuverable aircraft
technology
LVD' linear	 variable	 differential
transducer
RCVD remotely controlled vehicle and
display
SMS stores management set
WATR Western Aeronautical	 Test Range
Introduction
The increasing LG.r;lexity of modern high-
performance aircraft systems requires innovative
techniques to allow the flight test community to
safely and effectively test these systems prior
to their generalized use. These complex systems
are often crucial to flight safety and require
teams of engineers in a ground control station
for analysis and monitoring. These systems range
from new and unusual aircraft, such as the X-29
forward-swept wing (FSW) aircraft, through advanced
avionics and flight control systems (FCS), as in
the advanced fighter technology integration (AFTI)
F-16 aircraft, or advanced wing design and control,
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as on the AFTI/F-111 or F-8 oblique wing aircraft
(Fig. 1). Each of these advanced system concepts
are intensively flight tested (incurring extensive
costs and time expenditures) prior to their use
in a production environment. Current techniques
available to engineers involved in flight testing
include monitoring aircraft analog parameters
(on strip charts and CRT displays) and discrete
information, such as system status and failure
identification (on simple CRT displays or light
boards). Engineers involved in monitoring test
flights are required to have a complete knowledge
of the system they are monitoring and an ability
to identify critical events as they occur. In
the brief !ime allowed during critical flight
test events, in high-stress situations, it is dif-
ficult for any individual or group of individuals
to always correctly identify and rectify, if
necessary, problems that often occur on new
advanced systems.
A major concern in advanced high-performance
aircraft systems is the digital flight control
system (DFCS). New high-performance aircraft
are often substantially unstable and require
augmentation from a full-time, full-auti,,,ity
FCS. The complexity of a control system ret,iired
to control the unstable aircraft and improve
mission performance dictates that the FCS be a
digital computer. As DFCSs become essential,
monitoring becomes more critical. Problems that
occur in the DFCS can cause the loss of an ai--
craft, the abortion or cancellation of a flight,
or forced modification o f the flight test. Fast
and informative displays of the status and health
of the DFCS can save a 'light, a mission, or the
aircraft itself. Currently established flight
test monitoring technology involves discrete
data transmitted from the aircraft and displayed
on CRTs or light panels with little, if any,
interpretation.
Figure 2 illustrates the levels of flight
monitoring automation involved in evaluating
and correctinq the status and health of DFCSs.
Level 1 is early systems monitoring with primi-
tive capabilities, which involved immense light
panels displaying the discrete information with
no interpretation or evaluation, as used in the
early highly maneuverable aircraft technology
(HiMAT) program. The systems engineer who moni-
tored the flights was required to monitor over
100 lights, determine the status and health of the
FCS, and recommend the correct action required to
improve the crisis situation. Level 2 is the
current level of flight monitoring in which somr
logical operations are performed on the discrete
information downlinked from the aircraft; however,
no interpretation is available, and the systems
engineer must still determine the DFCS status and
health from multiple discrete information displays
on a CRT. Both the AFTI/F-16 and X-29 aircraft,
with their complex DFCSs, are currently at this
level of auto,iation in systems monitoring. The
systems engineer still must assemble all the
information, determine the status and health of
the DFCS, and recommend the best procedures to
resolve discrepencies; these functions are all
performed in a high-stress environment, in an
extremely limited time frame, and with very little
easily accessible information other than that
remembered at the time. For safety, current DFCSs
contain backup systems that relieve some pressure
from the monitoring systems engineer.
Level 3 requires a system that interprets
the data, automatically provides this information
to the monitoring systems engineer, and al ows the
systems engineer to access the knowledge of the
operation of the DFCS. Further enhancing such a
system (level 4) would permit the monitoring
system to automatically recommend and justify
corrective action. Level 5 evaluates the health
and status of the DFCS and reconfigures the
control system automatically to accommodate this
evaluation. The body of this paper presents the
design and development of a level 3 system that
can be developed to level 4. An expert-system
flight status monitor is being developed that will
inform the systems engineers of the FCS problems
and determine their cause; this expert will recom-
mend corrective action and generate appropriate
p rocedures for normal and emergency operation.
Mo0vation `or Expert-System
F light Status Monitor
During flight testing of new and complex
DFCSs, problems have occurred '.hat the systems
engineer has attempted to solve in real time,
not always successfully. The resolution to the
problems is often discovered after several days
of studying the documentation, after which the
engineers realize that they had known the solu-
tion but had not applied it to this situation.
Another situation that often occurs is that a
flight is aborted or a mission cancelled because
of a detected problem; it may later be determined
that the problem was negligible or not as severe
as first thought, and the flight could have been
shifted to another mission, accommodating the
failure. At the Dryden Flight Research Facility
of NASA's Ames Research Center both situations
have occurred, costing both time and money. Three
examples of situations that have occurred at Ames-
Dryden are included to illustrate the need for an
improved method of DFCS monitoring.
HiMAT Gear-Up Landing
The NASA HiMAT remotely piloted vehicle vas
a highly s., cessful program with only a few in-
flight problems, one of which is discussed here.
The HiMAT was performing a normal mission when it
lost one of two uplink recievers used to accept
commands transmitted from the ground station. The
HiMAT was flown remotely by a pilot in a ground
cockpit, with commands transmitted to receivers on
the aircraft and aircraft feedbacks transmitted to
ground computers. A cockpit switch signaled the
control system computer to deploy the gear, and
the control system translated the command into a
cycled signal understood by the HiMAT. The TF-104
chase crew member controlled a backup gear deploy-
ment switch that could be manually cycled, if
necessary, to provide the correct signal to the
aircraft. After the loss of one of the uplink
receivers on board the HiMAT, the cockpit gear
switch was activated, but the gear d.d not deploy.
The correct sequencing requirement was remembered
and correctly performed, but the gear stayed up,
and the vehicle was landed (safely) on its belly.
The problem was investigated after the flight;
the systems engineers ultimately realized that
the loss of one uplink receiver changed the com-
mand persistence requirement for the gear-down
sequencing. Knowledge of the sequencing and per-
sistence requirement for cycling the gear switch
was available, but it was not recalled during the
critical period and was not included in the normal
documentation.
AFTI/F-16 Multi p le Mode Cha
The AFTI/F-16 aircraft includes a complex
avionics s.iite, incliAing a stores management
set (SMS) and fire control computer (FCC) along
with a comp l ex triplex DFCS, all of which com-
municate on an IEEE 1553 data bus, with the FCC
acting as the primary bus controller and the SMS
acting as backup bus controller. During the DFCS
flight test phase, the AFTI/F-16 contained four
standard modes, four decoupled modes, and multiple
submodes. On an early flight the DFCS received
multiple (over 300) uncommanded mode change re-
quescs, which it then acted upon; this resulted in
the aircraft experiencing multip l e mode changes in
a short time period. When this problem was
detected on the ground through the flashing of
mode lights, a solution was sought. Approximately
5 min later the systems engineer had the pilot
turn off the SMS, and the mode switching stopped.
The four standard FCS modes and multiple submodes
were all engaged through the SMS via the 1553 data
bus with no protection built into the DFCS to pre-
vent multiple mode switching in a short period of
time. In the stressful environment of an early
flight on an unusual and complex flight control
system in an urgent situation, the systems
engineer could not readily recall the critical
knowledge and required more than 5 min to deter-
mine the appropriate action.
AFTI/F-16 Flight Control System
Failure Indication
Each channel in the triplex DFCS of the
AFTI/17 -16 aircraft is capable o f determining
its own status and ', ealth, as well as that of
the other channels, and then transmitting that
information to both the pilot and the ground
monitoring station. At the same time, failures
on the DFCS are divided into several subcomponents
and levels, making it difficult to determine the
actual operating state of the system. The fail-
ures are displayed to the pilot and ground station
in a numeric code that indicates each channel's
diagnosis of the problem and the element that has
failed. During an envelope-expansion flight, an
onboard failure ff the FCS caused each channel to
establish a different failure state and to provide
conflicting information to the pilot. The systems
engineer had to decipher the fault codes generated
by each channel for all components, determine
the failure conditio . and recommend a corrective
action, all within minutes. The recommP^"_c,:
action was to reset the FCS, hop'ng that the
situation would improve without a :,,,tplete under-
standing of the condition of :re system. The
i
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reset caused further degradation of the system,
forcing the actuator to select the backup hydraulic
system. The aircraft remained controllable and
landed safely due to the redundancy built into
the DFCS. The systems engineers spent several
hours after the flight determining what the fault
codes meant, and several days elapsed before they
understood the problem along with its cause (an
internal software switch had induced different
states into each of the three flight control
channels, causing each channel to develop a dif-
ferent view of the aircraft and system state).
The three p-oblems just described are only
a sampling of proble ms that occur during the
flight testing of new, advanced, complex systems.
Even with the best design process, not all con-
tingencies are covered. Information may be dis-
covered too late in the design and test cycle
tc be incorporated immediately, and it must be
carri ad as part of the system knowledge until
it can be included in the design. The system
complexity also requires a great deal of system
knowledge simply to monitor the system within
normal operations. At Ames-Dryden, an expert
system is being developed to help solve these
problems. An expert system would ccitain the
knowledge (which the systems engineers so labor-
iously acquire) in an easily accessible form
in the control room, which would reduce the time
necessary to recall or rediscover the needed know-
ledge. The same expert system would also be able
to recommend the appropriate corrective action
to more quickly reduce the hazard by using its
ability to draw on a larger data base than the
systems engineer. The probable causes of the
proble..i could be assessed by this expert system
and relayed to both the systems engineer and the
pilot for evaluation, which would again reduce
the time required to develop a safe solution.
Description of the Expert System
A conceptual view of an expert-system flight
status monitor is shown in Fig. 3. The system
must be able to receive information on the status
and health of the FCS from telemetry downlink data
and translate this information into a usable for-
mat. Conventional programs have been developed
that receive -eleme:ered downlinked data and very
rapidly translate them into digital words. This
information could then be input to the expert
system. The expert system must then determine
whether any changes have occurred compared with
the previous sample and, if so, evaluate the effect
of these changes. The expert-system flight status
monitor must update its knowledge base at a rate
that i s compatible with the aircraft downlinked
data. A data-driven foreground loop will deter-
mine the state of the system and inform the user,
in this case the systems engineer, of the changes
and consequences. If a failure occurs, a warning
or caution will be issued along with corrective or
emergency procedu r ^s, if required. As a part of
this evaluation, 'he expert system may be required
to ask the user questions on the state of the
aircraft. A background task will allow the .ser
to query the monitor for information on FCS state
or the rationale the monitor used to reach its
conclusions. The expert system will interrupt
the background task when necessary to evaluate
new data. If the state of the FCS has not changed
between inputs, the expert system will not re-
evaluate that state.
The knowledge base will contain both aircraft
specific rules,
If AC Power is Failed
Then Analog Reversion Mode
Is Failed,
and metarules, the rules that the systems engineer
uses to determine the correct action for a failure
situation,
If Ail Downlink Data is Failed
Then There Was A Telemetry
Spike.
The knowledge base will also contain rules to
allow the expert system to determine the air-
craft state and the required corrective action
and to inform the systems engineer of its eval-
uation. The expert system will consist of rules
to emulate the failure detection system of the FCS
and compare the state it generates to that of the
aircraft. If the monitor's conclusions disagree
with the aircraft state, a warning will be issued
and the user will be able to ask the expert system
to resolve this conflict. The conflict resolutijn
will be processed as part of the background task
to allow the monitor to evaluate the aircraft
information as it is generated. The ground-based
expert system will also be able to communicate
with the pilot by a remotely computed display
driven from information generated by the expert
system and telemetered to the aircraft via the
NASA Ames-Dryden uplink system. The ability to
transmit the expert-system knowledge to a pilot
display using ground computers will allow pilot
Interaction without waiting for the development
of flight-qualified systems and will allow the
pilot to access much-needed information in criti-
cal situations without the delay of waiting for
the information from the ground station. A tech-
nique will be developed to allow the pilot to
respond to queries from the expert system for
information needed to determine the status of the
aircraft.
A major concern in the development of an
expert-system flight status monitor is the cap-
ability of operating in real time, since the
information is available to the expert system
from tht aircraft at speeds of 40 to 50 Hz and
the amount of information to be processed can be
from a few words to over 100 bits of information.
The time available to analyze and develop recom-
mendations when a problem occurs in the flight
environment is very short because the aircraft
can lose control within seconds; consequently
any expert system developed to assist in monitor-
ing must be able to respond in seconds. Therefore,
the real-time issue is of great concern and is
being explored. Different inference techniques
for real-time operation are being investigated,
along with the data, or rule, representations.
The development of data structures that improve
the real-time implementation and allow easy inodi-
(!J
fication and adaptation to the knowledge base is
essential for an operational system.
The ultimate goal in the development of an
expert-system flight status monitor is to demon-
strate the capability of a real-time expert
monitor providing "intelligent" interpretation
of system status information and to apply this
monitor in the control room environment, the
Western Ae r v.autical Test Range (WATR). The
syster, will init ially be designed as a stand-
alone system capabl± of evaluating simulation or
flight tapes. Thee the system will be incorpor-
ated into the simulation environment for testing
and evaluation, installed in the control room,
and later, extended to the aircraft to allow the
pilot direct interface with some subset of the
monitor. A small subset of a DFCS is currently
being used to develop the knowledge representa-
tion and inference mechanisms for a demonstration
system, but the know.edge base will be expanded
to incorporate the full FCS as the expert system
develops. The system will continue to expand,
from a full description of the FCS to other systems
on board the aircraft, until the expert-system
flight status monitor ctnnot operate in real time.
At this point, new computer hardware or software
techniques will hopefully be available to allow
the system to expand and operate in real time.
Development Approach
To address the development of an expert-
system flight status monitor, Ames-Dryden systems
engineers are developing an experimental system
while an experienced contractor is developing an
operational system in cooperation with Ames-Dryden
engineers, The in-house effort concentrates on
developing experience in expert systems while a
knowledge base is developed for the operational
system. Various knowledge representations and
new techniques will be investigated prior to
operational implementation. The contractor's
parallel effort is directed toward developing
an operational system using the aircraft-specific
knowledge derived from in-house development,
developing a working real-time system, and sharing
proficiency in expt-* systems.
The f i rst developmental go , in the real-time
system I ,  an operational demonstration system
capablr of processing simulatiun or flight data;
such ;, system will improve the speed of processing
failure information after a flight and will inter-
act with the user to determine the FCS state.
This system (to be developed by the contractor
in association with Ames-Dryden engineers) will
be an interactive, non-real-time system that will
demonstrate the rule base and inference structure
to be used on the real-time system. After the
successful completion of the non-real-time expert-
system flight status monitor, a real-time system
based on the previously developed structure will
be implemented and interfaced with a real-time
hardware-in-the-loop simulation of the aircraft.
The simulation wi*il provide real-time FCS data
v4 a a data bus interfaced with the expert-system
flight status monitor. The simulation will be
used to test the system in a real-time environment
and to provide necessary : verification and valida-
tion of the expert system prior to its implement-
ation in the control room (Fig. 4). After verifi-
cr,tion and validation, the system will be inter-
faced to the downlinked data from the aircraft
systems, through either the control room (WATR)
or the remotely controlled vehicle and display
(RCVD) simulation facility. Once an operational
system has been developed, the knowledge base will
be expanded until either the limit of the expert
system is reached or the aircraft systems have
been completely defined. After an expert-system
flight status monitor has been successfully demon-
strated in the control room, the system will be
extended to allow interfacing with the pilot
through the Ames-Dryden uplink system. A remotely
controlled display, driven by the remotely com-
puted display system, wi'l be developed to inter-
face the expert system with the pilot.
Status of Expert-System
Flight Status Monitor
In-house development of the expert-system
flight status monitor has been underway since
November 1984, and a working non-real-time system
has been demonstrated on a multiuser VAX 11/750
in Common LISP. The knowledge base currently
includes only the input sensors for the aircrafL
and their respective status and mode indications
(Fig. 5).	 Input sensors include roll rate, pitch
rate, yaw rate, pitch stick command, roll stick
command, yaw pedal command, actuator position
feedbacks, normal accelerometer, lateral acceler-
ometer, air data, and power interfaces. The FCS
used for the demonstration (Fig. 6) is a triplex
configuration with both input and output voting.
It features a triplex independent backup system
that is dissimilar to the primary system and digi-
tal channels capable of independently switch from
the primary to the backup system. The actuators
used also contain a voting plane, but they were
not included in the current expert-system flight
status monitor. The hierarchy, or relationship
of each element to the others (Fig. 5), is
included in the expert system at a level at
wh ch only the direct interrelationship is
included, with no interpretation given.	 This
al'ows the monitor itself to develop the tree-
like interrelationships, thereby eliminating the
human error of missing an interface or inputting
an incorrect interface.
Improved knowledge representation is currently
under development to allow for a more effective
system. A knowledge acquisition t,ol has been
developed to allow easy user interaction and
improved aircraft rule acquisition. The opera-
tional demonstration system (jointly developed
by Ames-Dryden and the contractor) is to be. com-
pleted by early fall 1985 (Fig. 7). With the
demonstration of the fe+sitility of tnis system,
development of the real-timt system will begin
by mid-1986, and an operational real-time expert-
system flight status monitor will then be inter-
faced with the aircraft telemetry downlink data
and evaluated by the systems engineers. The
interface of the expert system to the aircraft
crew station is not scheduled until 1987, and
knowledge base development is expected to continue
uninterrupted.
•
6
ORIGMIAL Pa's::.' :•b
OF POOR QUALIFY
i
Concluding Remarks
The application of expert systems to flight
test monitoring is particularly appropriate.
The monitoring task is manpower and information
intensive anu is fairly well understood. The
capabilities of a system to monitor data down-
linked from the flight test aircr t and to
generate information on the state and health
of the system for the n mitoring engineers will
provide increased safety di' ing flight testing
of new systems. The expert system will provide
the sy s tems engineers with ready access to the
large amount of information required to describe
a c iplex aircraft system; access to this infor-
matiun in an easily understood form will enhan,e
engineering capabilities in understanding and
developing future complex systems. The poten-
tial power of such a system, originating frr,m
the beginning of a development program, is
enormous. As both the expert system and the
aircraft systen are developed, discrepancies can
be resolved prior to the actual testing of the
aircraft system. The expert system can be main-
tained at the same rate as the aircraft system,
providing easy, user-friendly knowledge storage.
The expert system can be integrated with the simu-
lation prior to flight testing; anomalies that
occur in the simulation can be better understood
in real time without wasting hours of simulation
time. As new information about the aircraft
system is discovered, the expert system can he
updated to contain the most complete knowledge
available.
A demonstration system has been developed
that, although not operating in real time, shows
great promise for the use of expert systems in
the flight test environment. The development of
an expert system has been helpful in defining
the operation of the FCS. Even though the know-
ledge base is limited, the development of the
demonstration system generates, new engineering
knowledge that contributes to the effectiveness
of *he engineers and to program safety. The cen-
tral location of the knowledge base is another
useful hyproduct of this development.
X-29A FSW advanced aircraft design	 AFTIIF-16 advanced avionics and flight control
system
AfTI/F-111 advanced wing control 	 F-8 oblique-wine research aircraft advanced wing
control
Fig. 1 Typical Ames-Dryden aircraft with advanced control systems.
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